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Take This Quiz First
The mortgagor torches the property; the carrier pays the first mortgage and takes an assignment of that lien. Who is then entitled to the remaining value of the property: the carrieras assignee of the first mortgagee -or the second mortgagee -who was a named insured under the policy but whose loss fell outside of its policy limits? That is the intriguing issue raised by an Alabama Supreme Court decision in January of this year. Think how you would decide the matter before reading on.
The Complete Story
The actual facts in Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v Kirkland, 2011 WL 49851 (Jan 7, 2011 , were rather more complicated than this oversimple teaser, so here is a more accurate description of all that happened. Lunceford purchased a restaurant from the Kirklands for $1,850,000, exchanging some other property and giving Kirklands a note for $550,000, secured by a second mortgage on the real property, and further secured by a first lien on the personal property on the premises. Lunceford got the rest of the financing through an acquisition loan from Vision Bank for $1,110,000, which was secured by a first mortgage on the real property, and a second on the personalty. Underwriters issued its insurance policy with $1,500,000 coverage for the real property and $250,000 for the personal property, the policy including endorsements insuring both Vision and Kirklands as well as Lunceford.
Two years later, Lunceford set fire to the restaurant; Underwriters paid Vision $1,072,000 (the cash value of the real property); and also paid Kirklands $250,000 for the personal property. Those insurance payments, however, left Vision short $80,000 on its first mortgage, and Kirklands short $370,000 on their second mortgage.
The land apparently had some significant residual value, because both Underwriters and Kirklands began maneuvering to get it. Underwriters obtained a pro tanto assignment of Vision's mortgage for the $1,072,000 it had given Vision; Kirklands then paid Vision the unpaid balance of its first mortgage -$80,000 -and took their own partial assignment from Vision for that amount.
Underwriters and Kirkland then disagreed as to who could next reach whatever was left.
Ranking the Losses
To recap, the parties were left with four losses (not listed in ranking order) : Underwriters -a) $1,072,000 (paid to Vision) and b) $250,000 (paid to Kirklands); Kirklands -c) $80,000 (paid to Vision) and d) $370,000 (unpaid on its second).
Two of those four items are easy to rank. Kirklands' $80,000 claim for the payment they made to Vision (c) must be first, because it came from an assignment of Vision's senior rights in the first mortgage for that amount. Conversely, Underwriters $250,000 loss (b) must come in last, because it was based on a payment to Kirklands, and Underwriter's policy had declared that Kirkwoods rights "to recover the full amount of the mortgageholder's claims will not be impaired" by Underwriters rights. (The nonimpairment clause.)
The difficult issue was ranking Underwriters (a) claim of $1,072,000, against Kirklands' (d) claim of $370,000. An Alabama trial court thought that Kirklands' claim was superior, but the state's Supreme Court ruled the other way: Underwriters was held to be prior because it had a partial assignment from Vision of that much of its first mortgage, which mortgage had priority over any claim by Kirklands arising under their second mortgage; since Vision was in front of Kirklands for that $1,072,000 (because its mortgage was a first mortgage), then Vision's assignee, Underwriters, stood in those same shoes and in the same place in line.
Alabama and Massachusetts Stand Together
The reasoning of the Alabama Supreme Court duplicated that of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in a similar case, decided a decade earlier: The Money Store v Hingham Mutual Fire Insurance, 718 NE2d 840, 1999. Both high courts rejected contentions that the carrier's position as assignee of the first mortgagee should be subordinated to the second mortgagee on the ground that the nonimpairment clauses included in those policies applied to both lenders. Both held that a nonimpairment clause would disable a carrier from seeking priority for repayment of what it had paid to its insured as against that same insured's remaining claim for the unpaid balance of its insured's loss -a proposition that is also true for carrier's subrogation rights in general -but that a nonimpairment clause does not estop the carrier from asserting the priority of its claim of subrogation to an insured senior it has paid over a different junior lender, even if insured under the same policy and with the same nonimpairment clause protecting it.
"The Kirklands' interest was always subordinate to the interest of the first mortgagee. Therefore, the Kirklands stand in the same position they were in before Vision Bank assigned its interest to Underwriters. Thus, we cannot say that recognizing the priority of Underwriters interest in the first mortgage over the Kirklands' interest in the second mortgage impairs the Kirklands' right to recover its mortgage debt." Kirklands had attempted to get around this logic by arguing that subrogation theory never allows an insurer to trump its own loss payee, but the Alabama Court -quoting the Massachusetts Court -observed that Underwriters claim was not based on subrogation but rather on assignment, different doctrines which "are not the functional equivalent of each other. The former speaks of broader equitable rights and remedies. Assignment is legal in nature and has an established meaning … with respect to the rights of an assignee of a first mortgage." Thus what might be true for subrogation was not true for assignment.
Some Consolation
So did you, reader, guess wrong about who had priority? Did you conclude that, in the opening example of this article, the second mortgagee's claim should rank above its carrier's? If you did make that mistake, you may nevertheless take some comfort from the fact that the Alabama trial court also got it wrong, as did the trial and appeal courts in Massachusetts ten years earlier. Indeed, the Massachusetts Appeals Court had been even more wrongheaded because it had opined that there was no real distinction between assignment and subrogation; to it, "the assignment clause is the functional equivalent of subrogation." More seriously, the Massachusetts Appeals Court had believed that public policy ran in favor of the junior lender:
"Neither the subrogation mechanism nor the assignment device is supposed to bestow a windfall on the insuror as to junior mortgagees. Were that not so, the obligation to pay junior mortgagees would be meaningless; insurers could and would cheerfully pay off the first mortgagee, foreclose and shut out the junior mortgagees."
Ironically, the Massachusetts Appeals Court, in committing this error, relied on what it thought was a generally accepted principle: "A New Jersey court, deciding that an insurer's rights from subrogation and assignment may only be exercised after the mortgagee has recovered its debt from a combination of insurance policy proceeds, foreclosure proceeds, and payments by the mortgagor, thought the relative paucity of cases expressly so holding was "probably because that is so obvious and well settled under our form of mortgage clause [the standard clause] that the question is seldom raised." First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. of Hammonton v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. Super. 252, 254, 241 A.2d 653 (1968) .
Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals [its high court] had come to a similar conclusion (Mutual Fire Ins v Dilworth, 173 Atl 22, 1934) , basinb its result mainly on the fact that the policy before it (as did the policy in Kirkland) included not only a nonimpairment clause, but also the standard provision that the mortgagee's protection "shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor". (A "no neglect" clause.) Because of the inclusion of that clause:
"if the claim for preference of lien made by the insurance company as to the first mortgage is well founded, it must be because of an act of the mortgagor-owner which invalidated the policy as to him, and which permitted the insurance company to validly claim nonliability as to the mortgagor and owner. By the terms of the clause under consideration, the insurance company only becomes entitled to be subrogated and to have an assignment of the first mortgage, upon its payment, if and when the owner is guilty of some act or neglect which entitles the insurance company to claim nonliability as to him. It follows that this act or neglect is the basis for the insurance company's claim to a preference over the [second mortgagees], the allowance of which would be in the teeth of the provision of the clause which provides that no act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner shall invalidate the interest of the appellees; they being mortgagees …. The second mortgagees were as certainly protected under the terms of the policy as the first mortgagee; and the policy issued by the insurance company afforded that protection.*** The logical, true, and equitable construction of the terms of this contract is that the insurance company, upon the payment to the first mortgagee, is subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee, as against the mortgagor or owner, but not as against the second mortgagees. Any other construction, in our opinion, would not be equitable, resulting as it would in no loss whatever to the insurance company, and impairment, if not a total destruction, of the value of the second mortgage, which, as heretofore several times stated, the insurance company contracted should not be invalidated or impaired by any act of the mortgagor or owner, or any subrogation or assignment by the first mortgagee to it. (italics mine)
